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Abstract:  
 This paper is based upon the assumption that firm profitability is determined by its degree 
of diversification which in turn is strongly related to the antecedent decision to carry out 
diversification activities. This calls for an empirical approach that permits the joint analysis of 
the three interrelated and consecutive stages of the overall diversification process: diversification 
decision, degree of diversification, and outcome of diversification. We apply parametric and 
semiparametric approaches to control for sample selection and endogeneity of diversification 
decision in both static and dynamic models. After controlling for industry fixed-effects, 
empirical evidence from firm-level data shows that diversification has a curvilinear effect on 
profitability: it improves firms’ profit up to a point, after which a further increase in 
diversification is associated with declining performance. This implies that firms should consider 
optimal levels of product diversification when they expand product offerings beyond their core 
business. Other worth-noting findings include: (i) factors stimulating firms to diversify do not 
necessarily encourage them to extend their diversification strategy; (ii) firms which are endowed 
with highly skilled human capital are likely to successfully exploit diversification as an engine of 
growth; (iii) while industry performance does not influence profitability of firms, it impacts their 
diversification decision and degree.  
Keywords: Diversification; Firm performance; panel data; sample selection; parametric and 
semiparametric models. 
JEL Codes: L21; L25; C14; C23.  
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1. Introduction 
What determines the optimal boundaries of the firm across industries? How does a firm 
expand from its core business into other product markets? These questions have raised 
substantial research interests from the initial landmark article The Nature of the Firm by Coase 
(1937) and book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm by Penrose (1959). Since then, different 
theories (resource-based view, transaction cost, agency theory, etc.) have been proposed to 
explain firm diversification (Chandler, 1962, Berry, 1975, Rumelt, 1974, Andrews, 1980). The 
early industrial organization literature has argued that no significant relationship exists between 
diversification and performance, meaning that, when entering new markets, existing firms have 
no special advantages (see, e.g., Gort, 1962, Arnould, 1969, Markham, 1973). More recently, 
researchers have shown that diversification generates multiple outcome directions depending on 
the degree of relatedness of a firm’s diversification activities (Palich et al., 2000; Qian, 2002). 
These studies share one common finding that the diversification/performance relationship 
follows a non-linear pattern: they are positively related up to a point, after which a further 
increase in diversification is associated with declining performance.  
 
Notwithstanding this change of perspective, scholars have so far mostly focused on the single 
causal effect of degree of diversification relatedness on firms’ subsequent performance, 
neglecting the whole diversification process that firms involve in until the final diversification 
outcome is recognized. The important question left unanswered is therefore: why not all firms 
engage in diversification activities or receive equally positive outcomes from their diversification 
strategies? Exploration of antecedent factors determining a firm’s likelihood to diversify as well 
as how much it can diversify upon its green-light decision might lead to an answer. 
 
First, we argue that it may not be appropriate to analyse the diversification/performance 
relationship in a single-equation framework, since it is strongly related to the pre-determined 
factors that induce firms to engage in diversification. Thus, we investigate the whole 
diversification process in three interrelated and consecutive equations: diversification decision 
(what determines a firm to diversify?); diversification degree (once a firm decides to diversify, 
what determines the degree of its diversification relatedness?); and diversification outcome (how 
does a firm’s diversification degree influence its profitability?). Since the three equations are by 
nature interrelated, we take into consideration the possibility that their disturbances are 
correlated, and thus, we need to be careful in choosing the right estimation methodology given 
the existence of unobservable characteristics that affect the three stages under study. 
 
Second, we are aware that ANOVAs or cross-sectional least squares regressions are 
inadequate to study the relationship between diversification and performance, since these 
methodological approaches treat the decision to diversify exogenously, i.e. firm-level and 
industry-level characteristics as well as the influence of the external environment are implicitly 
assumed not to have any effect on firms’ diversification strategies. Consistent with Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2002) and Lang and Stulz (1994) among others, who show that firm and industry 
characteristics influence a firm’s decision to diversify, we take into account the sample selection 
and endogeneity issues from correlated disturbances by applying advanced parametric and 
semiparametric estimation methods for both static and dynamic treatments of firm-level panel 
data. Initially, sample selection will be tested and corrected by four estimation approaches: the 
standard Heckman’s two-stage method, the Vella (1998) and Wooldridge (1995) parametric 
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approach, Heckman et al.’s (1998) kernel-based propensity score matching, the Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2010) model. Each of these approaches is employed in the first two stages: a binary 
choice selection equation determining whether or not the firm diversifies, and then conditional 
on its diversification decision, we observe its degree of relatedness to the firm’s core business; 
subsequently, endogeneity of diversification degree is controlled in the firm performance 
equation, under the hypothesis that unobserved individual-level and firm-level characteristics 
might influence both firms’ diversification decision and their subsequent profitability (given 
their diversification decision and diversification degree choice). For this purpose we apply the 
GMM and Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM estimation approach for both static and 
dynamic treatments. 
Apart from the novelty of investigating the diversification/performance relationship in a 
comprehensive three-stage process and controlling for selectivity and endogeneity issues with 
advanced methodological approaches for firm-level panel data, this work makes another 
contribution as a pioneer in studying diversification activities of firms in a transition country. We 
argue that diversification can be a growth strategy also for firms in transition countries. We rely 
on the dataset of the whole population of firms in Binh Duong, the most competitive province in 
Vietnam after excluding state-owned and foreign firms, which is extracted from the annual 
enterprise survey of Vietnam General Statistics House. 
 
Key findings of the present study are: (i) factors stimulating firms to diversify do not 
necessarily influence their diversification degree to the same extent of sign and magnitude; (ii) 
firms with higher debt ratio are more likely to diversify and with stronger degree; (iii) export 
firms have more opportunities to recognize diversification activities, but do not necessarily 
diversify at stronger degree than non-export firms; (iv) diversification has a curvilinear effect on 
firm-level profitability: product diversification improves firms’ profit up to a point, after which a 
further increase in diversification is associated with declining performance; (v) firms endowed 
with highly skilled human capital are likely to successfully exploit diversification as an engine of 
growth; (vi) low industry profitability significantly stimulates firms to diversify into other 
business sectors, but does not have any impact on their overall performance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical discussion on 
product diversification and its relationship to the performance of firms. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the dataset that we use for this paper. Section 4 presents the operationalization of 
variables adopted together with their descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Section 5 
develops the approach(es) that we apply to obtain final empirical estimation after relevant tests 
for the existence of sample selection and endogeneity. Section 6 discusses the estimation results, 
and finally, section 7 gives some concluding remarks for policy implication and future research. 
 
2. Literature discussion 
There have been a number of researchers proposing definitions and measures of product 
diversification. Ansoff (1965), defines a diversification strategy as the entry into new markets 
with new products, whereas Kamien and Schwartz (1975) define it as a firm’s degree of product 
and market involvement. For Jacquemin and Berry (1979), product diversity refers to the degree 
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of relatedness among various product segments. Following Rumelt (1974), several scholars1 
view diversification as the strategy of adding related or similar product/service lines to existing 
core business, either through acquisition of competitors or through internal development of new 
products/services, which implies increase in available managerial competence within the firm. 
 
In this sense, diversification is a matter of degree of relatedness among the activities carried 
out by a firm. Product relatedness is defined as the extent to which a firm’s different lines of 
business are linked by a common skill, market, purpose, or resource (Rumelt, 1974; Luo, 2002). 
Recent studies have attempted to examine diversification patterns from underlying resource 
requirements: the degree to which two industries use the same types and proportions of human 
expertise (Farjoun, 1994) or rely on the same inflows of technology (Robins and Wiersema, 
1995). However, these studies characterize resources only at the industry level, which limits the 
ability to address issues relating to heterogeneity in firms’ resource bases. Thus, in practice, 
diversification is normally measured as the number of activities a firm undertakes in different 
sectors. The degree of relatedness is then measured with reference to the system of standard 
industrial classification (SIC codes). While this type of measure incurs inherent limitations for 
not taking into account internal managerial effort or resource requirements underlying 
observable diversification activities and relying on proximity among SIC codes (Silverman, 
1999), it has still been applied commonly in empirical parts of this work due to its availability 
and straight forward nature. 
 
Montgomery (1994) distinguishes three motivations for diversification: the search for market 
power; the solution to agency problems; and the application of bundles of resources to attain a 
competitive advantage (resource-based view). Focusing on the determinants of the distribution of 
the firm’s activities over industries beside its primary focus on vertical integration, transaction 
cost economics suggests that diversification is an alternative contractual method by which a firm 
can exploit its surplus resources (Silverman, 1999). By the same token, Grossmann (2007) 
submits that diversification may be a mean to extend the boundaries of a firm in the presence of 
internal coordination problems, which naturally arise in large firms. Multiproduct firms can 
increase their market power by cross subsidisation activities, i.e. market strength in one 
particular industry may be used to sustain low price strategies in other markets. Similarly, Teece 
et al. (1994), Christensen and Foss (1997), Foss and Christensen (2001) agree that diversified 
firms can create positive spillovers since the value of resources in one industry increases due to 
investment in another industry. Finally, the internal capital markets hypothesis indicates that 
diversified firms arise when financial market imperfections force managers to allocate funds 
more efficiently than the external capital market (Klein and Lien, 2009). 
 
Usually, firms diversify as long as they see the opportunity to consolidate their market 
power, which predicts a linearly positive relationship between diversification and profitability. 
Diversification strategies undertaken by growth-oriented managers may both well exploit scope 
economies and at the same time increase firms’ market power. An efficient way to increase firms’ 
market power is the multimarket contact hypothesis (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Scott, 1993; 
Spagnolo, 1999), following which firms meeting in several markets have a greater incentive to 
network with each other in order to sustain collective power. By diversifying in a similar way (in 
order to exploit cost synergies), a group of firms might create and consolidate a situation of 
                                                          
1Such as Markides (1995), Markides and Williamson (1994), Tallman and Li (1996), Nachum (1999). 
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multimarket contacts where collusive practices are more likely to emerge. With respect to the 
effects, good performance outcomes for diversified firms are consistent with both market power, i.e. 
firms meeting in several markets co-ordinate to increase their bargaining power on setting higher 
prices, and efficiency reasons, i.e. firms diversify to exploit positive cost externalities. 
 
Whereas the market power search approach is consistent with a linear positive relationship 
between diversification and profitability, the agency approach predicts a negative relationship as 
managers use free cash flow for the sake of their own goals. This leads to considering 
diversification in large firms as a result of the separation between ownership and control which 
induces managers to pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholders. Hoskisson and 
Hitt (1990) suggest that diversification, firm size, and executive compensations are highly 
correlated to the extent that diversification provides benefits to managers that are unavailable to 
investors. Diversification can also lead to the problem of moral hazard due to conflict of interest 
between managers having interest in costly diversification as a form of compensation and 
investors preferring to concentrate on the core business to maximize their returns (Bhide, 1990).  
 
Third, the same negative relationship between diversification and firm performance is also 
predicted by the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959). Firm is seen as a collection of sticky and 
imperfectly imitable resources or capabilities which strengthens its competition against its 
competitors (Barney, 1986). The deployment of surplus resources and free cash flows is one of 
the prime motives of diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). However, asset specificity 
embedded in firms’ resources on one hand brings sustainable competitive power for their owner 
relative to competitors, but on the other hand acts as a challenge impeding firm’s ability to 
transfer resources to new applications or “transplant” them in a new context (Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988). Therefore, the value of diversification will depend on the complementarities 
existing between internal resources and the business/industry that the firm enters, as well as the 
diversifying mode that it chooses. This opens the way to several empirical predictions revolving 
around the concept of relatedness of diversification activities: the more closely those activities 
are related or complementary, the more profitable diversification is expected to be. Regrettably, 
the resource-based approach to diversification has generally not considered the possibility that 
firms can exploit resources through market arrangements rather than through expansion of 
corporate boundaries. Although resources can be exploited through contracts, the regularly-
assumed valuable, rare, inimitable, and difficult-to-imitate resources are too “asset specific” 
(Williamson, 1985) to be contracted in market transactions.  
 
Finally, researchers of transaction cost economics suggest that diversification is an 
alternative contractual method by which a firm can exploit its resources (Silverman, 1999). 
However, no matter how business activities are related, the transfer of product and process 
technology among different industries with different characteristics normally requires certain 
modification and adjustment, which incurs varying degree of transaction costs as a result (Qian, 
2002). When a firm moves into a market with only a weak connection to its primary line of 
business (unrelated diversification), it often lacks the know-how and managerial resources to 
prevail against the competition in this new industry. Diversification beyond a certain degree 
raises internal governance and administration costs to the point that performance suffers (Jones 
and Hill, 1988). Thus, many of the most significant failures of diversification can be traced to the 
failure of achieving sufficient relatedness between business sectors (Grant, 1988). The related 
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hypothesis in transaction cost approach claims that multi-business firms holding portfolios of 
similar related business might obtain efficiency advantages unavailable to non-diversified firms 
or firms with unrelated portfolios. According to Lien and Klein (2006), economic sense of 
relatedness implies that resources in one industry are substitutes for, or complements to, 
resources in another industry. Whether the firm successfully integrates new business sectors 
depends on the comparative costs and benefits of contracting, not on the underlying production 
technology. Iacobucci and Rosa (2005) suggest that group formation offers a solution to 
problems created by market imperfections that increase transaction costs. 
 
Empirically, the impact of diversification on firm performance is mixed (Datta et al., 1991; 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Some studies claim diversifying into related product markets 
produces higher returns than into unrelated markets, others propose that less diversified firms 
perform better than highly diversified firms (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1974, 
1982). Some claim that the economies in integrating operations and core skills obtained in 
related diversification outweigh the costs of internal capital markets and smaller variances in 
sales generated by unrelated diversification (Datta et al., 1991). While Prahalad and Bettis (1986) 
claim that it is not product-market diversity but the strategic logic applied by managers that 
determines the effect of diversification on performance, Montgomery (1985) argues that it is not 
management conduct, but industry structure that governs firm performance.  
 
Vannoni (2004) observes that diversification is normally approached focusing either on the 
synergies exploited by diversified firms and on the optimal organizational structure for managing a 
multiproduct firm (strategic management approach) or on the relationships between market/industry 
structure (industrial organization approach). In each discipline the empirical literature has grown 
with scarce contacts with the other one. Thus, the need to construct and/or reinforce an 
interdisciplinary dialogue is particularly evident in this area of studies. 
 
With respect to the strategic management approach, corporate strategies despite being based 
on various sets of management guidelines addressing the question “what is the appropriate scale 
and scope of the firm?”, all converge in dealing with conflicting demands of synergies and 
responsiveness with respect to allocating resources (Wit and Meyer, 2005). Successful corporate 
strategies are the result of organizational capabilities or competencies that allow firms to exploit 
potential synergies that large size or diversity can offer. On one hand, the synergy of interrelated 
businesses within a diversified firm brings in the benefit of economies of scope which arise from 
sharing both common tangible inputs such as markets, distribution systems, product and process 
technologies, or manufacturing facilities (Ansoff, 1965; Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980), and 
intangible assets such as brand names and know-how (Qian, 1997), managerial capabilities and 
routines and repertoires (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Grant, 1988). The more interrelated the 
businesses of a firm, the greater the potential for organizational synergy (Rumelt, 1974; Salter 
and Weinhold, 1981). On the other hand, synergy has harmful effects owing to responsiveness, 
such as higher governance costs, slower decision-making, strategy incongruence, dysfunctional 
control, and dulled incentives (Wit and Meyer, 2005). Thus, the fundamental challenge facing 
corporate diversification is the conflicting forces stemming from synergy and responsiveness, or 
as described by Dess et al. (2003), “managing the conflict between the new and old (business 
activities) and overcoming the inevitable tensions that such conflict produces for management”. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies of synergy and responsiveness only enable us to state whether 
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diversification has a positive (due to synergy) or a negative (due to responsiveness) effect on 
firm performance, or which type of diversification, related or unrelated, is more beneficial. With 
respect to the curvilinear relationship between diversification and firm performance, we cannot 
explain to what extent the positive effect from synergy fades away and will be replaced by the 
negative effect of responsiveness, or why moderate levels of diversification yield higher levels of 
performance than either limited or extensive diversification (Tran and Zaninotto, 2012). 
 
With respect to the industrial organization approach, diversification as the proxy for 
economies of scope is investigated in relation to firms’ innovative capabilities. Firms are 
assumed to have different innovative capabilities that lead them to pursue different types of 
product diversifications (Cohen and Klepper, 1992). A firm with a diversified portfolio of 
products may be better positioned to determine the general applicability of new ideas than a firm 
with a narrower portfolio of products, because it can capture internal knowledge spillovers. 
Indeed, firms selling only one category of products are less likely to engage in R&D than those 
selling a broader range of products (Piga and Vivarelli, 2004). Given the same competencies for 
the production and delivery of core products, together with the same incentives to diversify, 
firms possessing more dynamic capabilities will be more likely to expand their product scope 
(Doving and Gooderham, 2008). 
Regardless of which disciplinary and theoretical perspective one adopts, most studies support 
a non-linear relationship between diversification and profitability (for a review, see Palich et al., 
2000). Appropriateness of product diversity is judged by a balance between economies of scope 
and diseconomies of scale, which indicates a limit on how much a firm can diversify. If a firm 
goes beyond this point, its market value suffers (Markides, 1992). Related diversification enables 
corporations to perform better if they expand their stocks of strategic assets efficiently and in 
consistency (Teece et al., 1994). Among the studies including measures of relatedness in order to 
discriminate between type and level of diversification, Vannoni (2000) presents evidence for a 
sample of Italian firms that irrespective of the number of industries in which they are active, they 
reach good performance results thanks to the relatedness of their diversifications strategies. 
 
Based on the above survey of the relevant literature, we propose the following proposition on 
diversification activities of firms: 
Proposition: Product diversification has a curvilinear relationship with profitability: positive 
when firms expand into industries related to their original industries and negative when they 
diversify beyond their original industries. 
 
3. Data description 
Panel firm-level data from 2001 to 2006 were extracted from the GSO (General Statistics 
Office) of Vietnam’s database of annual national enterprise surveys. Since we wished to omit the 
effects of the unique macro-economic and institutional environment of each province, only firms 
located in the province of Binh Duong were used for the empirical analysis. In other words, we 
use the whole population of firms in an administrative unit, rather than samples of representative 
firms from different ones, for the analysis2.State-owned monopolistic firms (electricity, water 
                                                          
2The rationale to select for analysis only observations in one province is: (i) to isolate the effect of institutional and macro-
economic features which are assumed to be homogenous to every firm within one province; (ii) to control for the influence of 
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supply, post and telecommunications) and foreign-invested firms, which are generally large-
scaled and over-capitalized, were removed from the analysis to avoid extreme outliers. Thus, the 
final sample consists only of private firms. 
 
Binh Duong was chosen because of its competitive and dynamic market3. The firm-level 
dataset includes segment data (ISIC code, segment sales, assets), accounting data (debts, 
revenue, profit, assets), basic demographic data (year of inception, ownership structure, size of 
labor force, technical personnel), and business owners’ individual-level information (gender, age, 
education levels). Our final sample only comprises multi-segment firms with data available at 
both firm and segment levels. Since we investigate the whole diversification process overtime, 
from decision stage to final outcome, only firms established before 2001 and still operating in 
2006 were used for analysis. The final dataset forms a balanced panel of 5580 observations 
consisting of 903 firms observed continuously over a period of 6 years. 
 
4. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Firm performance: Various measures of firm performance produce strikingly different 
results (for a review, see Deeds et al., 1998). For instance, R&D-intensive companies may have 
low profits during the developmental stage, but this does not mean that their value, i.e., the 
amount of shareholder wealth, is equivalently low. Similarly, recent analysis has found a 
negative correlation between sales growth and performance measures of earnings per share, 
return on equity, and return on investment (Murphy et al., 1996). In this paper, the profitability 
measures employed are return on sales (ROS) and return on investment (ROI). They indicate 
how net income is earned from each thousand Vietnamese dong (VND) of sales and total 
investment respectively. ROS is the ratio between after-tax profits and sales; ROI is the ratio 
between after-tax profits and total annual investment. The rationales for using ROS and ROI, 
rather than the widely-used logarithm of profit or ROA (return on assets) are: logarithm of profit 
excludes firms operating at loss (negative profit) from the analysis, whereas sales and annual 
investment are generally expressed in more current monetary terms than are assets, which would 
carry book values and require a longer time frame of availability (Geringer et al., 1989). 
 
We focus our analysis on firm performance equation with ROI as dependent variable. ROS 
estimation is placed in Appendix C for benchmark purpose. Our rationales for choosing ROI as 
the main dependent variable can be explained as follows. Diversified firms normally obtain sales 
generated from different sources. As we mentioned above, firms may diversify into a new 
business sector in order to balance out the loss or reducing profit that they incur from their 
current industries; thus, a low ROS does not mean their diversification activities are not 
successful. However, ROI captures the return on firms’ annual invested capital into 
diversification activities. It shows us directly the performance of diversification investment by 
excluding the impacts of other revenue sources. There is also no evidence that firms considered 
in our analysis undertake their diversification policy by setting up independent businesses, so 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
industry characteristics at national level, which are minor or even trivial in firms in a province; and (iii) to allow good statistical 
control of the dataset, consisting of all observations within a geographical area, e.g.,  to  prevent potential spatial autocorrelations 
increasing variances of disturbances if the analysis is conducted at cross-regional level. 
3Binh Duong is always among the top three provinces with the highest PCI index (Provincial Competitiveness Index) (PCI, 2005; 
PCI, 2006; PCI, 2007; PCI, 2008). The PCI ranks the ability and willingness of provincial governments to develop business-
friendly environments for private sector development. 
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final performance measures (profit, sales) reflect the over performance of all business units and 
from all income sources. For growth measures, an attempt was made to use growth of sales as a 
dependent variable to reflect a firm’s performance, but the test for serial autocorrelation 
indicated significant violation of the assumption of no serial correlation, which seriously biases 
final findings with panel data. Therefore, although it is only one of several objectives of an 
enterprise, we focus on profitability as measure of firm performance. 
 
Product diversification index: Gollop and Monahan (1991) list five properties of a 
diversification index. It must: (i) vary directly with the number of products; (ii) vary inversely 
with the increasingly unequal distribution of products across product lines; (iii) vary directly 
with the dissimilarity or heterogeneity of products; (iv) apply equally well to various scopes: 
plants, firms, and industries; and (v) be bounded between zero and unity. In this paper, we 
measure diversification by the entropy index (Appendix A), the most common and robust to all 
these five properties (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). Segment information from SIC codes 
(Standard Industrial Classification) was used to construct it. The index is sensitive to changes in 
the number and distribution of products: it is bounded below by zero (0 ≤ E <ln(n)). As the 
number of products increases, the entropy index increases at a decreasing rate; but, as the 
distribution of products becomes more equal, it increases at an increasing rate. The index is 0 
when the firm produces in only one industry (diversification is absent) and is equal to ln n in case 
the sales are equally distributed among n industries. 
 
Control variables: To isolate the relationship between product diversification and firm 
performance, one has to control for other variables that are likely to affect profitability. Since our 
aim is to isolate the effects of “product diversification” on performance, we introduce three 
categories of control variables: (i) individual level: educational attainment, age and gender of the 
owner; (ii) firm level: firm size, age, capital intensity, debt ratio, technological resources, and 
whether the firm exports its products / services; (iii) industry level: profitability proxied by 
average industry ROA (return on assets). The inclusion of these variables in the model is based 
on three streams of literature: industrial organization, management, and finance (Markides, 1995; 
Hitt et al., 1997; Qian, 2002; Santarelli and Tran, 2013). 
 
• Technological resources: Grossmann (2007) indicates that technological resources are 
driving forces behind a positive relationship between product diversification and firm 
performance. It has been widely recognized that these may be measured through R&D 
activities (for a review, see Audretsch, 1995): Indicators of R&D inputs, such as R&D 
investments and R&D personnel, indicators of R&D processes, e.g., number of hours 
devoted to R&D, and indicators of R&D outputs, e.g., number of patented inventions, or 
new product innovations introduced on the market. In this study, provided that protection 
of intellectual property rights is still inadequate in Vietnam, the rate of qualified R&D 
teams and technical employees in the total labour force of firms is adopted as a proxy for 
their technological resources. 
• Firm size: economic size and labour force size. Economic size is taken as the natural 
logarithm of total firm assets. A quadratic term is also added to establish a non-linear 
relationship between firm size and its performance. Labour force size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees. The logarithm transformation was 
used because size is highly skewed and extreme values strongly affect correlations with 
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other variables. Firm size is normally used as a proxy for competitive position and firms’ 
advantage within an industry (Johnson et al., 1997). 
• Firm age: It is related to the level of experience, learning and managerial competencies 
that a firm accumulates. The age effect on firm performance is inconclusive and 
controversial, depending on the specific environment and industry where firms reside. In 
view of the dynamic features of an emerging market, aging may impede the ability of 
firms to be alert and capture profit opportunities with timeliness and efficiency. The 
effect of firm age is explored by means of the number of years that the firm has been in 
continuous operation. 
• Capital intensity: Some firms are, by the nature of technology, more capital-intensive 
than others. Within any particular industry, a firm may choose a highly automated 
process or a more labour-intensive one. As Porter (1976) stated, capital intensity in the 
form of industry-specific assets acts as a barrier to exit. In general, capital intensity 
imposes a greater degree of risk, because assets are frozen in long-lived forms which may 
not be easy to be sold. Given that return (and risk) varies with capital intensity, 
differences in profitability are likely to be associated with capital intensity between 
diversified and undiversified firms. As Shepherd (1979) noted, there are several ways of 
measuring capital intensity, all showing similar patterns. The present study uses the ratio 
of net fixed assets to total number of employees. 
• Debt ratio: the finance literature indicates that the leverage situation of firms strongly 
influences their value. On one hand, Opler and Titman (1994) found that highly 
leveraged firms lose a substantial market share to their more conservatively financed 
competitors. On the other hand, diversification can improve debt capacity, so reduce the 
chances of bankruptcy by going into new products / markets (Higgins and Schall, 1975), 
and improve asset deployment and profitability (Teece, 1982). Generally, the more debt 
in the firm’s financial structure, the more volatile its earnings and the greater the risk to 
owners and creditors. Thus, the debt ratio, measured as the ratio of total debts to total 
assets, is adopted to isolate the effect of a firm’s leverage capacity on its diversification / 
performance. 
• Entrepreneurs’ characteristics: we control for individual level characteristics of business 
owners by including three variables: gender, age and professional education of the 
entrepreneur. ‘Gender’ attains 1 if the entrepreneur is female; and 0 otherwise. ‘Age’ is 
the natural number of the entrepreneur’s age. Professional education is a dummy attains 1 
if she/he has a bachelor / master/ or PhD degree; and 0 otherwise.  
• Average industry profitability: Since we include observations across multiple industries, 
it comes essential to consider industry average level performance. One of the motives for 
firms’ diversification is when their core business has matured or started to decline or to 
reduce cyclical fluctuations in sales. The direction of their diversification will be those 
emerging industry with increasing profitable opportunities. The prevailing approaches to 
measure industry-level performance are either to include the industry average level of the 
particular performance measure (ROA, ROS, profit, etc.) as an independent variable 
(Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). Industry dummy variables, as an alternative for 
representing industry effects in a multi-industry study, seem like an elegant solution, 
since they provide a direct method for accounting for potential differences among 
industries without the trouble of parsing out which particular characteristics are most 
likely to be relevant. However, the significant increase of model variable reduces 
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statistical power of the model, as well as fails to account for intra-industry or intra-sector 
differences (Sharp et al., 2013).This paper uses average ROA of all firms in the 2-digit 
industry as the proxy for industry profitability level.  
 
Appendix A lists the variables adopted here, as well as how to measure/construct them and 
their descriptive statistics. Appendix B lists the pair-wise correlation matrix of the dependent 
variable and independent variables. We can see from the correlation matrix below, composed of 
81 pair-wise correlations, that 66 are statistically significant. However, most of them are not 
numerically substantive with correlation coefficients below 0.3. Two substantive correlations 
which should be noted are the strong, positive correlation between ROS and ROI (0.7407) and 
economic size and labour size (0.6854). This is reasonable since both ROS and ROI are 
measures of firm profitability. Economic size and labour size are intuitively positively related.  
 
5. Estimation model 
We analyze firm diversification strategies and performance in three stages: decision (firms 
decide to diversify or not), degree (to what extent of relatedness firms will diversify once they 
decide to diversify), and outcome (the subsequent performance of firms given their 
diversification decision and diversification degree). We control for sample selection bias in the 
first two stages. We take into account the fact that either outperforming firms or 
underperforming firms may be more likely to undertake diversification than their counterparts. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) proposed the possibility of self-selection bias such that poor performers 
diversify in search of growth opportunities because they have exhausted such opportunities in 
their existing activities. Thus, diversification strategy is probably correlated with controlled 
observable firm characteristics and unobserved characteristics absorbed in error terms. 
The endogeneity of diversification degree is controlled in stage 3 to account for firm 
characteristics that both lead to diversify, how much they would diversify and as well affect firm 
values. As pointed out by Campa and Kedia (2002), and Graham et al. (2002), diversified firms 
may trade at a discount not because diversification destroys value, but because undervalued firms 
tend to diversify. Thus, diversification is endogenous and the same sectors that cause firms to be 
undervalued may also cause them to diversify. Campa and Kedia (2002) propose that correcting 
for selection bias and endogeneity using panel data and fixed effects and two-stage selection 
models substantially reduces the observed discount. On the other hand, for the outcome of firms 
given their diversification strategies, it is plausible to assume that it takes some time until the 
payoff of firms’ diversification is recognized. We propose two models, static and dynamic, in 
which the lagged dependent variable is included to isolate the effect of potential performance 
shock. For each model, we provide two specifications that treat the decision to diversify as 
exogenous and endogenously respectively to take into account those characteristics which lead 
firms to diversify and affect their value simultaneously. 
Sample selection models have received a great deal of attention since the seminal work of 
Heckman (1974) on female labor supply. Traditionally, maximum likelihood procedures are 
applied to deal with the sample selection. However, the validity of such methods requires correct 
specification of the error distribution, which can be problematic in practice. The standard 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method requires the normality assumption of error terms, which is 
too strong to hold in practice. In the past two decades, a number of parametric and 
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semiparametric alternatives which do not require parametric specification of error distribution 
and functional form of heteroskedasticity have thus been proposed (Horowitz, 1992; Klein and 
Spady, 1993; Heckman and Smith 1995; Heckman et al., 1997). In a semiparametric approach, 
part of the functional form of the model, normally the selection equationis parametrically 
specified based upon plausible assumptions, while the rest of the model is not parameterized.  
While different semiparametric estimation methods to deal with sample selection have been 
proposed in theoretical literature, there has still been a lacuna in their applications to empirical 
problems in economics. 
5.1 Diversification equation 
 
The selection equation can be specified as follows:  
 = 1		

∗ =  +  > ̅
0		
∗ =  +  ≤ ̅
 																																				(1) 
where  is an observable indicator that takes value 1 if firm 	 diversifies in year , and 0 
otherwise; ∗  is a latent variable reflecting firm’s diversification effort such that firm 	 decides 
to diversify if it is above a given threshold ,̅  is a set of explanatory variables affecting the 
decision to diversify of firms, and  is the error term.  
 
Once the firm decides to diversify, the next decision point is the degree of diversification, 
i.e. the extent to which the new products / services are unrelated to the core product portfolio of 
the firm.  
 = 
∗ =   +  		
 = 1
0																															
 = 0
 																			(2) 
 is a set of determinants of degree of relatedness of firm’s diversification.  
Under the selection rule described by (1) and (2), we have 
(\,  ,  > 0) =   + ( \ > −, ,  )					(3) 
 
The least squares method of regressing  on   is an inconsistent estimator of   if 
the second term on the right size of (3) is nonzero. If we are willing to assume that error terms in 
both (1) and (2) are&(0,∞). The standard Heckman (1976, 1979) two-stage method provides 
consistent estimators. Heckman suggests to restore a zero conditional mean by including an 
estimate of the selection bias term, ( \ > −, ,  ) . Under normality 
assumption, this term is proportional to the inverse Mills ratio which can be estimated by probit 
or tobit from equation (1).  
 
However, in many empirical problems, the distribution of the errors is not known or is subject 
to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. In such cases, the maximum likelihood estimator will not 
provide a consistent estimate (Goldberger, 1983). Also, for censored panel data with fixed 
effects, maximum likelihood estimation methods will generally be inconsistent even when the 
parametric form of the conditional error distribution is correctly specified (Honore, 1992). Thus, 
it is important to develop estimation methods that provide consistent estimates for sample 
selection dataset when the error distribution is non-normal or heteroskedastic. Vella (1992, 1998) 
and Wooldridge (1995) relax this assumption and propose the alternative two-stage estimation 
methods that may have better finite sample properties.  
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Under the assumption that ,  ) are independent of ,  ), Vella and Wooldridge 
note that ( \,  , ,  > 0) = ( \,  > 0). If one further assumes that ( \) = (, then the selection bias correction term is (. We can estimate  by )* =  −*, where * is the tobit or probit estimator of . Thus we can use , rather 
than Heckman’s (1979) inverse Mills ration, as an additional variable in the conditional 
expectation. There are two advantages of this method relatively to the standard Heckman 
procedure: (i) when   and the inverse Mills ratio are near collinearity,  has more variation 
than  , thereby making the Vella-Wooldridge estimator more stable and thus more efficient 
(see Wooldridge, 2002); (ii) the method is computationally less costly, relaxes the strong 
normality assumption, and more robust to near collinearity in data (Christofides et al., 2003).  
 
It is plausible to assume that ( \) = +(), where +(. ) is an unknown function. We 
can easily show that (\,  , ) =   + +(). Thuswehave 
 =   + +() + - 							(4) 
Where -  satisfies (-\,  > 0) = 0. Following Robinson (1988) and using the data 
with  > 0, from (4) we can get  − (\) = / − ( \)0 + -							(5) 
 
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) propose the correction for selection bias that allows form 
heterogeneously distributed and serially dependent error terms in both selection and primary 
equations. Since the method allows for a rather flexible structure of the error variance and do not 
impose any nonstandard assumptions on the conditional distributions of explanatory variables, it 
provides a useful alternative to existing approaches. Assuming the error term (1) as  =  +2, and in equation (2) as  =  + 2 	; and   are the unobserved fixed effects (maybe 
correlated with ), and 2  is an idiosyncratic error. We assume that (2\ , ) ≠ 0 for 
some elements of  . Further, assuming that  = 
() + 4 , where 
(. )  is a known 
function, and (4\) = 0 . Using a more flexible Chamberlain’s (1980) specification,  = 
() + 4 = 56 + 4 . Similarly, we also have  = +() + 4 = 56 +4 .This condition is similar to the within transformation and produces the fixed-effects slope 
estimators in balanced panel data. Combining with (2), we obtain: 
 =   + 56 + 4 + 2 =   +56 + -=   + 56 + ((- \, ) + 7 													(6) 
where - ≡ 4 + 2, - = 4 + 2 , (7\) = 0.With a slight abuse of notation, for  = 1, (6) can be written as  =   +56 + (: + 7 											(7) 
We estimate equation (7) in two stage: (i) For each year, use probit to estimate the equation: 
<( = 1\) = =( + 56 ) . Use the resulting estimates to obtain :> ; (ii) For 
 = 1, use pooled 2SLS to estimate equation (7), where :  is replaced by :> , in which 
, 5, :> are used as instruments. Interactions of :> with year dummies are included as well 
to allow (to be different across . 
 
Propensity score approach has recently been adopted as an efficient way to address selection 
bias semipatrically (see Shadish et al. 2002 for a brief overview of propensity scores). This paper 
will follow Heckman and Smith (1995) and Heckman et al.’s (1998) to construct a regression-
adjusted semiparametric conditional difference-in-differences matching estimator. In other 
words, propensity scores take into account all variables that might play a role in the selection 
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process and create a predicted probability (i.e. propensity score) of diversification vs. non-
diversification from a logistic regression equation and kernel-based matching. These scores then 
can be used to match diversification and non-diversification as a covariate in the main equation. 
The results from four estimation approaches: the standard Heckman’s two-stage method, the 
Vella (1998) and Wooldridge (1995) parametric approach, the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) 
model correcting for both endogeneity and selectivity, and the Heckman et al. (1998) kernel-
based propensity score matching method, are reported in table 5. 
 
Both parametric and semiparametric identification of sample selection model generally 
requires and “exclusion restriction” – that is, a regressor that is included in the set of regressors 
 for the binary variable  (the selection equation) must be excluded from the list of ? in 
the equation of interest (degree of diversification). This paper will adopt a dummy which 
indicates whether firmsare involved in export / import activities as the exclusion restriction. We 
believe that when conducting business transactions with foreign partners, firms will be more 
likely to decide to diversify their production in order to capture emerging demands from global 
market. However, the degree of their diversification activities will not be influenced by whether 
they export/import or not, but mainly by their production capacity and potentiality. The 
exclusion restriction test is presented in Table 1 
 
Before estimating the selection model, we performed two tests for the presence of selection 
bias in the diversification degree equation. So far various tests have been proposed by Verbeek 
and Nijman (1992), Vella (1998), Wooldridge (1995), Das et al. (2003), Hsiao et al. (2008), and 
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). While Verbeek and Nijman (1992), and Hsiao et al. (2008) 
propose the test for panel data models with exogenous explanatory variables, Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2010) use fixed effects to remove unobserved heterogeneity, and hence, permit 
arbitrary correlation between idiosyncratic errors and regressors. The test is based on the within 
transformation and has an importance advantage over alternative testing procedures because it is 
valid in the presence of arbitrary correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory 
variables. Given its novelty, we apply this test in three steps: (i) for each year, use probit to 
estimate <( = 1\) = =( + 5@) . Use the resulting estimates to obtain the 
inverse Mills ratio :> ≡ :(A + 5@>); (ii) For  = 1, use fixed-effect two-stage least 
squares (FE-2SLS) to estimate the equation:  =   + B:> +  with , :>  as 
instruments. The interactions of :>with year dummies are included as well to allow B to be 
different across ; (iii) We use t-statistic to test CD: B = 0 for the significance of inverse Mills 
ratio, and the Wald test to test CD = B = ⋯ = BG = 0 for the significance of the interactions.  
 
The second selection bias test we apply is the non-parametric test proposed by Das et al. 
(2003), and applied by Hall et al. (2009) in their innovation intensity equation. First, a random 
effect probit model is adopted for equation (1) with ‘export’ dummy as the exclusion restriction. 
Second, predicted probability of diversification from the first regression and the corresponding 
Mills’ ratio are added in equation (2) as independent variables. Fixed effect least squares 
regression is adopted for the degree of diversification equation since we have a significant 
number of firms not diversifying (entropy=0). Selection bias is determined based on the 
significance of the predicted probabilities, the Mills’ ratio, their squares and interaction.  Results 
from the test for sample selection bias are present in table 1.  
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Table 1: Sample selection test and exclusion restriction test for the variable “export” 
Relevance  
Das et al. (2003) test 
 
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) test 
 
H (5) =   25.35 
p-value  =    0.0001 
IJK(1,5555) = 288 
p-value = 0.000 
IJK∗.LMNO(5,5555) = 24.89 
p-value = 0.000 
Quality test (correlated with regressors) H (1) = 5.11 
p-value = 0.0238 
Validity test (exogeneitycondition)  H (1) = 1.72 
p-value = 0.19 
 
The two sample selection tests indeed indicate the existence of selectivity issue in our panel 
data, which calls for relevant treatment with our estimation models reviewed above. The 
exclusion restriction test shows that “export” is a good exclusion since the firms’ likelihood to 
export is significantly related to their propensity of diversification (quality test), but does not 
influence how much they will diversify once they are involved in diversification (validity test).  
 
5.2 Performance equation 
 
We consider both static and dynamic estimation models for the third stage of firms’ 
diversification process, i.e. outcome. In the dynamic model, lagged dependent variable is 
included to isolate the effect of potential performance shock as well as to account for necessary 
time lag until the pay-off of diversification can be recognized. For each model, we provide two 
specifications with respect to whether diversification degree is treated as exogenous or 
endogenous. Although endogeneity bias is commonly confronted in cross-sectional studies, it is 
less frequently considered to be a source of concern in panel data estimation. This is partly due to 
the concept that fixed effects estimation eliminates most forms of unobserved heterogeneity 
(Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). However, Vella (1998) claims that certain forms of selection bias 
and heterogeneity cannot be eliminated with panel FE and RE models. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeneity later justifies the need to isolate the endogeneity bias of diversification 
strategies. 
 
The firm performance equation can be written as follows: 
PQ = PQR@ + @ + ?@S + T + 7              (8) 
(	 = 1,2, … , ;  = 1,2, … , W) 
In equation (8) above, PQRis the 1-year lagged value of return on investment of firm i in 
year t. For the estimation of the static model, PQR  is not included.   is the 
diversification index of firm i. ? is a matrix of control individual-level, firm-level, and industry-
level characteristics. T  an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect which allows for 
heterogeneity in the means of the PQ series across firms, and 7 is a disturbance term. A key 
assumption maintained throughout this work is that the disturbances 7 are independent across 
individuals. We also treat the firm-effects T  as stochastic, which implies here that they are 
necessarily correlated with lagged dependent variable PQR. 
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Test for violations of estimation assumptions: (77XX) = YZ
 									 = 	[,  = [			(C1)				
0											ℎ]	^]						(C2)		  
– Heteroskedasticity (H1) : the problem of heteroskedasticity is more prevalent in cross-sectional 
data, because they involve units and groups which are heterogeneous in nature. We apply the 
likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity in panel data and find out the strong existence of 
heteroskedasticity in our data. Thus, estimation with OLS is rejected, and the alternative 
estimation technique capable of correcting for heteroskedastic errors is “robust” regression 
method with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity by White’s method. 
Table 2 Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity test ROI 
Likelihood ratio test H (929)= 5522.95 
p-value = 0.000 
 
– Serial correlation in time-series data (H2): the Wooldridge test for first-order autocorrelation in 
panel data is insignificant even at the 5% level, which indicates the absence of first-order serial 
correlation in the ROI equation. Serially correlated errors will give biased estimators with 
increasing variances of estimated coefficients. In this case, we can feel sure that ROI as the 
dependent variable satisfies the assumption of no serial correlation.  
Table 3 Test for Serial Correlation 
Serial correlation test ROI 
Wooldridge first-order 
serial correlation test 
F (1,929) = 3.195 
P-value = 0.0728 
 
-  Endogeneity of diversification index: We consider the potential endogeneity of 
diversificationdegree; since we suspect that some unobserved individual-level and firm-level 
characteristics might influence both the firm’s diversification decision and its subsequent 
profitability. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (see below) does indicate the strong presence of the 
endogeneity of diversification. The test begins with the reduced form regression, in which the 
assumed-endogenous diversification index is the dependent variable and all other observed 
exogenous firm-level characteristics are independent variables. The residuals predicted from this 
regression are then added into the structural equation (1). The endogeneity problem is 
determined according to the significance of the residual coefficient. 
Table 4 Test for Endogeneity 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test H (1)    = 25.04 
P-value      =  0.0000 
 
Estimation methods: Several econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (8) 
 
1. Diversification index  is assumed to be endogenous.   
2. Time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics (fixed effects) T  may be correlated with and ?. 
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3. The panel dataset has a short time dimension (W = 6) and a large number of firms ( =
930) . Thus, the presence of the lagged dependent variable PQR may give rise to 
autocorrelation, since it is correlated with fixed effects. It is therefore also treated as 
endogenous variable. 
OLS estimators of @ are inconsistent, since explanatory variable PQRis positively correlated 
with error term (T + 7) due to the presence of firm-effects, and this correlation does not vanish 
as the number of firms in the sample increases. 
Within groups estimator eliminates this source of inconsistency by transforming the 
equation to eliminate T. However, for panels in which the number of time periods available is 
small, this transformation includes a non-negligible correlation between the transformed lagged 
dependent variable and the transformed error term: PQR − GR (PQ +⋯+ PQGR) and 
- − GR (- +⋯+ -G). Thus within groups estimator is also inconsistent here.  
 
To solve problems 1 and 2, one would usually use fixed-effects instrumental variable 
estimation (2SLS), but this depends on the availability and validity of exogenous instruments. 
We therefore decided to use the Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator, first proposed 
by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The lagged levels of endogenous regressor are used as 
instruments, which rise over time. This makes the endogenous variable pre-determined and thus 
not correlated with the error term in equation (8). 
To cope with problem 2 (fixed effects), the differenced GMM uses first-differences to 
transform equation (8) into:  
∆PQ = @∆PQR + @ ∆ + @S∆? + ∆7 														(9) 
By transforming the regressors by first differencing, the fixed firm-specific effect is 
removed, because it does not vary with time.  
Lastly, to cope with problem 3, the Arellano-Bond estimator was designed for small-T and 
large-N panels. For the endogenous lagged dependent variable, the first-differenced lagged 
dependent variable is instrumented with its past levels.  
 
Table 7 shows the estimation results from five estimation approaches: fixed-effects (FE) and 
random-effects (RE) model; instrumental-variable two-stage least-squares estimation (IV-2SLS) 
with GMM treatment for the static model; and the Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM 
estimator for the dynamic model. According to Baum and Schaffer (2003), generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation is more efficient than 2SLS when heteroskedasticity is present. 
Following Arellano-Bond (1991), the instrument for the endogenous diversification index is its 
one-period lagged value. This makes the endogenous variable pre-determined and, hence, not 
correlated with the error term in equation (8).  
 
6. Estimation Results and Discussion 
The estimation results for diversification decision and diversification degree of firms are 
given in Table 5 and 6. These tables show a striking consistency in the general pattern of results 
obtained. Table 5 presents 4 estimation models: (i) first step probit of Heckman two-step 
consistent estimates; (ii) joint maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) based on the joint 
normality of ( , ]); (iii) first step of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) method; and (iv) 
kernel-based propensity matching method. 
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Table 5: Probability of diversification decision  
   Probability of diversification 
Variable Heckman two-
step (1st step 
probit) 
Joint MLE 
(1st step) 
Semykina and  
Wooldridge (2010) 
(stage 1 of 2SLS) 
Heckman (1995) 
Propensity 
matching method 
Firm age 0.0205** 
(0.004) 
0.023** 
(0.004) 
0.02** 
(0.004) 
0.035** 
(0.006) 
Firm’s economic size 0.0385 
(0.0844) 
0.052 
(0.076) 
0.333** 
(0.084) 
0.098 
(0.146) 
Firm’s economic size square -0.0032 
(0.0044) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.017** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Firm’s labour size 0.111** 
(0.021) 
0.087** 
(0.021) 
0.095** 
(0.025) 
0.191** 
(0.035) 
Debt ratio 0.42** 
(0.071) 
0.379** 
(0.071) 
0.349** 
(0.088) 
0.787** 
(0.126) 
Capital intensity -0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.00006) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Technological resources -0.281* 
(0.134) 
-0.172 
(0.146) 
-0.465* 
(0.217) 
-0.489* 
(0.235) 
Export Y/N 0.125** 
(0.047) 
0.041* 
(0.021) 
0.128* 
(0.062) 
0.221** 
(0.081) 
Professional education Y/N 0.351** 
(0.0424) 
0.377** 
(0.040) 
0.403** 
(0.048) 
0.606** 
(0.073) 
Gender 0.155** 
(0.047) 
0.147** 
(0.045) 
0.082 
(0.055) 
0.263** 
(0.082) 
Age -0.0102** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.0166** 
(0.003) 
Average industry ROA -3.898** 
(0.817) 
-3.879** 
(0.873) 
-2.878** 
(0.932) 
-7.078** 
(1.471) 
:>   0.666** 
(0.148) 
 
:>* year dummies   H (5)=399.32**  
)aaa   H (9)=380.13**  
Intercept -0.15 
(0.407) 
-0.316 
(0.364) 
0.07 
(0.403) 
-0.111 
(0.705) 
Likelihood ratio test H (12) 240.17**   242.33** 
Observations 5580 5580 5580 5580 
Note: (*) significant at 5% level; (**) significant at 1% level; Standard errors in brackets 
 
Both the Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W test for normality assumption of the 
error terms in diversification decision equation indicate the rejection of the null normality 
hypothesis at 1% significance level. Thus, the Heckman two-step procedure requiring normality 
assumption may not be an efficient estimation method for our analysis. If we compared 
estimation results across different methodological treatments in Table 5, sign of estimated 
parameters are quite consistent although the statistical significance seems to be stronger with 
coefficients obtained from the first stage of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) approach. Note 
that the estimated equations here refer to the decision to diversify or not, rather than to the degree 
of diversification, so the estimated coefficients will carry a different meaning, i.e. the likelihood 
of undertaking a diversification policy.  
 
There is consistency in significant effect of firm age, firms’ labour size, debt ratio, 
technological resources, export, professional education, gender and age of firm owners and 
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average industry ROA. Significant and positive parameters of debt ratio indicate the leverage 
effect of loans on stimulating firms’ diversification activities. Technological resources proxied 
by the rate of technical employees in the whole labour force act as a barrier to firms’ entering 
new business sector. It is likely that technical employees with specialized knowledge in the core 
business are less willing to absorb new knowledge and skills required for crossing firms’ 
business boundaries, which is actually a significant source of change resistance in incumbent 
firms. We find evidences to support the quality test of ‘export’ as the exclusion restriction in 
sample selection treatment. Those firms exporting their products / services into foreign markets 
are more likely to undertake diversification in order to capture emerging demands, advanced 
technology and resources from international markets. 
 
Table 6: Diversification degree of firms 
 Degree of diversification (Entropy index) 
Variable Heckman  
two-step 
Joint MLE Semykina and  
Wooldridge (2010) 
2SLS 
Vella and 
Wooldridge 
(1994) 
Firm age 0.0149* 
(0.0065) 
0.013** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.028** 
(0.002) 
Firm’s economic size 0.181** 
(0.066) 
0.171** 
(0.076) 
0.151** 
(0.0405) 
0.087** 
(0.032) 
Firm’s economic size square -0.0095** 
(0.0035) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.0093** 
(0.0017) 
Firm’s labour size -0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.044** 
(0.013) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.144** 
(0.011) 
Debt ratio 0.193 
(0.13) 
0.193** 
(0.045) 
0.08** 
(0.027) 
0.702** 
(0.041) 
Capital intensity -0.001 
(0.0008) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001** 
(0.00008) 
Technological resources 0.074 
(0.127) 
0.007 
(0.097) 
0.251** 
(0.073) 
0.82** 
(0.063) 
Professional education Y/N 0.242* 
(0.105) 
0.221** 
(0.028) 
0.0363* 
(0.02) 
0.102** 
(0.0206) 
Gender 0.111* 
(0.058) 
0.118** 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.02) 
0.263** 
(0.022) 
Age -0.0013 
(0.0032) 
-0.037** 
(0.0015) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.008** 
(0.001) 
Average industry ROA -2.218* 
(1.219) 
-2.018** 
(0.59) 
-1.987* 
(0.928) 
-2.759** 
(0.362) 
:> 0.711* 
(0.365) 
 -0.136** 
(0.033) 
 
:>* year dummies   H (5)=10.7*  
)*    1.497** 
(0.059) 
Intercept 0.281 
(0.456) 
0.504* 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.403) 
-1.781** 
(0.184) 
Wald 
LR  
H (11) =31.05** H (11) =130.
28** 
H (17) =98.28**  
H (13) =5555** 
Observations 5580 5580 5580 5580 (1186 
uncensored) 
Note: (*) significant at 5% level; (**) significant at 1% level;  Standard errors in brackets 
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With respect to the effects of individual-level characteristics on the likelihood of firm 
diversification, significant impact could be found for all three control variables: other factors 
remain constant, firms having higher educated owners, or female owners, or younger owners are 
more likely to diversify than their counterparts. Finally, we witness the negative relationship 
between industry profitability, proxied by average industry ROA, and firms’ diversification 
decision. Apparently, firms facing low profitable opportunities in their own industry will have to 
search for opportunities in other industries: one of the motives for firms’ diversification activities 
is to compensate for their loss or poor performance in their core business.  
 
We again observe the consistency in the general pattern of results obtained. It is worth noting 
that the effects of some variables, for instance technological resources and firm size, in this 
equation contradict with their effects in the above diversification decision equation, which 
indicates that factors stimulating firms to diversify do not necessarily influence their 
diversification degree to the same extent and vice versa. Firm age is statistically positively 
related to degree of diversification of firms. Older firms with accumulating knowledge and 
experience tend to take risks of expanding their product portfolio generously rather than stay 
persistently within their core business. Economic size of firms, as expected, positively stimulates 
their diversification activities. Firms possessing larger asset pool have more favourable 
conditions to invest in R&D, and hence, are more incentivised to bring up radical innovations. 
However, the effect of economic size on the firm’s diversification intensity is nonlinearly 
decreasing to scale. Further increase of total asset to a certain level will not create the 
proportional positive effect on the likelihood that firms diversify into unrelated knowledge base. 
However, firm labour force size has a statistically negative impact on firms’ relatedness of 
diversification although it has a stimulating effect on firms’ likelihood to diversify: larger firm 
size on one hand facilitates firms’ diversification activities by transferring a part of their rich 
human capital into other business sectors, but on the other hand impedes the diversification into 
unrelated business activities which require higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness of 
business units. This is because there has been no evidence that large firms considered in the 
analysis undertake their diversification policy by creating independent business units. Finally, 
debt ratio and technological resources both significantly stimulate firms to increase their 
involvement in areas unrelated or just marginally related to their current domain of competence 
and corresponding opportunity set. Technical employees do not encourage firms to enter new 
business sectors; but once firms overcome this change resistance by taking part in some forms of 
diversification, they act as a stimulative source for firms to take risks in joining unrelated 
industries. Consistent with above findings, owners who are more educated, or female, or younger 
are more likely to go into unrelated diversification. We also find the negative relationship 
between industry profitability and firms’ degree of diversification. Firms may want to get out of 
their stagnant industry by diversifying into a completely new industry.  
 
Table 7 lists the estimation results for both static and dynamic models. The former adopts 
panel-data estimation: fixed-effects and random-effects regressions when diversification is 
assumed exogenously; and the GMM technique when it is assumed endogenously. The latter 
adopts differenced GMM estimation and measures diversification exogenously and 
endogenously respectively. Given the panel data structure and diagnosis tests performed above, 
the dynamic model with GMM treatment is the preferable estimation, based on which results are 
interpreted. 
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Table 7: Firm performance (ROI as the dependent variable) 
 
 Firm return on investment (ROI) 
 
Static model 
PQ = @ + ?@ + T + 7 
Dynamic model 
PQ= PQR@ + @ + ?@S + T + 7 
     FE1 RE1 GMM2 GMM 
exogenous3 
GMM 
endogenous4 
ROI (t-1)    0.375** (0.068) 
0.364** 
(0.062) 
Entropy 0.595** (0.121) 
0.267** 
(0.052) 
0.255** 
(0.0411) 
0.798** 
(0.188) 
0.78** 
(0.18) 
Entropysquared -0.257** (0.094) 
-0.073 
(0.056) 
-0.085* 
(0.043) 
-0.38** 
(0.133) 
-0.369** 
(0.129) 
Technologicalresources 0.046* (0.025) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
0.042 
(0.056) 
0.0448* 
(0.056) 
Leverage (debt ratio) -0.056** (0.0214) 
-0.068** 
(0.015) 
-0.083** 
(0.011) 
-0.118** 
(0.036) 
-0.116** 
(0.036) 
Capital intensity -0.0002 (0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.00001) 
-0.0001** 
(0.00005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Export 0.025** (0.0064) 
0.032** 
(0.0057) 
0.0349** 
(0.0052) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.035** 
(0.011) 
Firmage 0.0008 (0.0008) 
0.0005 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
Economicsize -0.098* (0.051) 
-0.087** 
(0.033) 
-0.084** 
(0.0185) 
-0.145* 
(0.06) 
-0.144* 
(0.061) 
Economicsizesquared 0.0053* (0.0025) 
0.004** 
(0.0017) 
0.0043** 
(0.0009) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
Laborsize 0.022** (0.0062) 
0.0049 
(0.0038) 
0.005* 
(0.0027) 
0.0088 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
Professioneducation Y/N 0.170** (0.011) 
0.125** 
(0.008) 
0.083** 
(0.005) 
0.14** 
(0.016) 
0.14** 
(0.016) 
Gender  0.025* (0.01) 
0.024** 
(0.0065)   
Age -0.003* (0.0017) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
Averageindustry ROS 0.018 (0.089) 
0.066 
(0.078) 
0.128* 
(0.061) 
0.108 
(0.088) 
0.101 
(0.089) 
Intercept 0.462* (0.241) 
0.399* 
(0.157) 
0.426** 
(0.087) 
0.685* 
(0.324) 
0.698* 
(0.328) 
F-value F(13) 
=29.04**  
F(14) 
=45.75**   
Wald Chi-sq  H (13)= 408.23**  
H (14) = 
295.15** 
H (14)= 
309.74** 
Hausman test H (12) = 229**    
Hansen J statistic  
of excluded instruments 
H (1)= 3.2 
P = 0.072  
Observations 5580 5580 4650 3720 3720 
Notes: (**): significant at 1% level; (*): significant at 5% level; Standard errors in brackets 
1: FE and RE estimators assume that the diversification index is exogenous.  2: GMM estimators assume that the 
diversification index is endogenous.  3: The differenced GMM estimator assumes that all explanatory variables, 
apart from the lagged dependent variable, are exogenous; robust standard errors are used to control for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 4: The differenced GMM estimator assumes that the diversification index 
and lagged dependent variable are endogenous; robust standard errors are used.   
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From Table 7, we can see that the coefficients of lagged ROI are statistically significant in 
both regressions, which indicates the superiority of the dynamic model with endogeneity 
treatment of entropy index. It is plausible that ROI has significant lag effect since firms base 
their investment decision this year contingent on the investment return of last year. The ROS 
equation is placed in Appendix C. In general, both ROS and ROI equations show substantial 
consistency in the pattern of regressor significance and size of coefficients. For the analysis of 
estimation results, we base our interpretation on the ROI equation. Due to the significant of 
lagged ROI, the dynamic model with GMM treatment is the better estimation technique. The 
Hausman test also indicates the superiority of the dynamic model with ROI as the dependent 
variable at 1% significance level4. 
 
We first discuss the estimation results from FE and RE regressions in which diversification is 
measured exogenously. The criteria for selecting the RE or FE model is often based on whether 
(T , b) = 0. The Hausman test with the null hypothesis that(T , b) = 0 can be rejected, 
whichindicates that the RE model is preferable.  
 
With ROI as the measure of profitability, both FE/RE and GMM estimations tend to find a 
positive relationship between entropy index and firm performance. Generally, more highly 
focused firms tend to have lower profitability or, equivalently, greater diversification raises 
profitability. In other words, positive effects occur as firms move from a single-business strategy 
to a diversification strategy. However, the significant parameters of the square of the entropy 
index indicate the non-linear influence of diversification: the positive effects of diversification 
gradually fall as the firm moves further and further away from its core business. These findings 
support our hypothesis and are consistent with most of those summarized by Palich et al. (2000). 
Based on previous evidences, they conclude that performance increases as firms move from 
single-business strategies to low-scaled diversification, but that the effect deteriorates as firms 
move away from the low end of related diversification to the high end of unrelated 
diversification. As Qian (1997) suggests, the relative costs and benefits of product diversification 
are likely to depend on how different business activities of a firm are related to each other. If 
they are loosely linked or poorly structured, they are less likely to complement or supplement 
each other, and hence, synergy will not exist.  
 
Obviously, the profitability of a firm can mainly be accelerated by increasing innovativeness 
through its accumulated technological resources. According to resource-based theory, a 
manufacturing firm’s technology resources are valuable assets for its survival and development 
and can differentiate its performance. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of R&D and 
technical personnel as a proxy of technological resources of a firm has a strong positive effect on 
its profitability.  
 
The relation between corporate performance and the debt-to-assets ratio has long been 
established in corporate finance literature (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Lang et al., 1991; 
Harford, 1999). According to this paradigm, capital structure choice is a trade-off between the 
                                                          
4H = 50.58 
p-value = 0.000 
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costs and benefits of debt. Although there is agreement among academics and practitioners on 
the benefits of debt, it may be argued that large firms are more likely to receive more benefits 
than medium-sized or small firms, at the same level of debt ratio. While loans significantly 
stimulate firms to be involved in diversification activities, their burden imposes a serious 
impediment to firm value, especially for small and medium-sized firms. Therefore, it is plausible 
that debt ratio is estimated to have statistical negative effect on firm profitability.  
 
We find a significantly convex relation between the economic size of firms in terms of total 
assets and their investment return. Larger firms realize lower return on investment than their 
smaller counterparts. Owners tend to face more challenges in allocating resources efficiently in 
large firms. It is worth noting that the majority of total assets of firms in Vietnam are fixed assets 
including land, machinery, equipments, etc. Their “asset specificity” made them difficult to be 
transferable to other business sectors (high transaction cost); and thus imposes a limitation in 
diversification pay-off, and in turn outcome that large firms can obtain. This tends to limit the 
firm's economic size to the extent that owners-managers achieve optimum efficiency. We do find 
the significant effect of quadratic coefficient of economic size to indicate a curvilinear influence 
on performance. Those firms exporting their products / services are likely to outperform their 
non-exporting counterparts. Finally, with respect to individual characteristics of owners, 
consistent with our previous finding (Santarelli and Tran, 2013) and a number of studies on the 
return to education (for instance, Cooper et al., 1994; Parker and Van Praag, 2006), professional 
education has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. We do not find evidences for 
a significant impact of industry profitability on firm performance. 
 
7. Conclusions  
Research tends to focus on performance outcomes of types and degrees of diversification 
rather than on what determines diversification in the first place (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; 
Doving and Gooderham, 2008). Although researchers share a common consensus that 
diversification is to deploy surplus resources and cash flows, they still fail to account for the 
antecedents of resource deployment, and in turn of diversification decision. Various approaches, 
resting on differing assumptions, justify divergent relationships. However, these assumptions all 
converge in dealing with conflicting demands of synergies and responsiveness with respect to 
diversification. Their investigation will enable us to understand whether diversification has a 
positive or negative effect on firm performance. Empirical results seem to be consistent with a 
resource- (or competence)-based view, which maintains that a positive relationship between 
diversification and profitability depends on the relatedness of diversified activities. However, as 
the driving forces of diversification and its profitable pay-off are resources or prior competences 
underlying diversification decision, it is still not clear what factors determine firms’ decision to 
diversify and to what degree (relatedness of their activities).  
 
This paper is pioneer in investigating firm diversification in a transition country in three 
interrelated and consecutive stages: decision, degree, and outcome. Controlling for individual-
level, firm-level, and industry-level characteristics we find out that (i) factors stimulating firms 
to undertake diversification decision do not necessarily influence their diversification degree to 
the same extent of sign and magnitude; (ii) firms with higher debt ratio are more likely to 
diversify and diversify with stronger degree; (iii) export firms have more opportunities to 
recognize diversification activities, but do not necessarily diversify at stronger degree than non-
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export firms; (iv) diversification has a curvilinear effect on firm-level profitability: product 
diversification improves firms’ profit up to a point, after which a further increase in 
diversification is associated with declining performance; (v) higher educated entrepreneurs are 
more likely to diversify, undertake stronger diversification strategy, and produce higher 
performance for their firms; (vi) low industry profitability significantly stimulates firms to 
diversify into other business sectors, but does not have any impact on their overall performance. 
 
We make extensive and integrated use of recent methodological developments in analyzing 
diversification strategies and their outcome for the population of private firms in a dynamic 
Vietnamese province. Particularly, we take into account the sample selection and endogeneity 
issues from correlated disturbances by applying different advanced parametric and 
semiparametric estimation methods for both static and dynamic treatments of firm-level panel 
data. Initially, sample selectivity will be tested and corrected by four estimation approaches, the 
standard Heckman’s two-stage method, the Vella (1998) and Wooldridge (1995) parametric 
approach, the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) model correcting for both endogeneity and 
selectivity, and the Heckman et al. (1998) kernel-based matching in a binary choice selection 
equation determining whether or not the firm diversifies. Conditional on its diversification 
decision, we observe its diversification degree (the extent of relatedness to the firm’s core 
business). Then endogeneity of diversification degree will be controlled in the performance 
equation since unobserved individual-level and firm-level characteristics might influence both 
firms’ diversification decision and their subsequent profitability (given their diversification 
decision and diversification degree choice). We apply the GMM and Arellano-Bond (1991) 
difference GMM estimation approach for both static and dynamic treatment. We rely our 
analysis on the dataset of the whole population of firms in Binh Duong, the most competitive 
province in Vietnam after excluding state-owned and foreign firms, which is extracted from the 
annual enterprise survey of Vietnam General Statistics House. 
From a policy perspective, it is important to ascertain level and degree of product 
diversification. In the case of SMEs with limited resources to sustain large-scale R&D 
operations, they might need support for adopting a “deep niche” strategy by concentrating 
resources on a few specialized products and services (Qian, 2002: 612). For large firms with 
complex multidivisional structures, they might need to rely on highly skilled workers or 
managerial competences to overcome those constraints in terms of organizational efficiency and 
corporate governance which represent the primary challenge impeding firms’ diversification 
degree or product scope. 
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Appendix A: Dependent and independent variables 
Categories Indicators Variables Measure Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
variable and 
explanatory 
variable 
Accounting measures 
ROS: Return on 
sales PQd =
Q]4	+	
	
W4e	^4e]^  5580 0.0207 0.2101 -1 1 
ROI: Return on 
investment PQ =
Q]4	+	
	
f24e		-]^g] 5580 0.0429 0.1702 -1 1 
Diversificationindex 
Diversification The dummy attains 1 if the firm diversifies, 0 
otherwise 5580 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Entropyindex 
(E) 
W	 = ∑ dln	(1 dk )
l  where d  is the share of 
segment 	 in the firm’s sales, and ln	(1 dk ) is the 
weight for each segment	. 
5580 0.096 0.2323 0 1.598 
Square of entropyindex 5580 0.0631 0.207 0 2.556 
Control 
variables: 
firm-level 
charateristics 
Firmsize 
Labor force size Natural log of total number of employees 5580 4.261 1.561 0 9.419 
Economicsize Natural log of total assets 5580 9.261 1.823 0 15.471 Square of natural log of total assets 5580 89.109 34.221 0 239.35 
Firmage Firmage Number of years firm has been operating 5580 6.268 4.856 1 60 
Technologicalresources R&D  personnel The rate of technical personnel in total firm labor force 5580 0.097 0.175 0 1 
Financial leverage Debt ratio ]m	4	 = W4e	n]mW4e	4^^]^ 5580 0.391 0.306 0 1 
Capital intensiveness Capital intensity o4	4e		]^	 = I	p]n	4^^]^&2gm]	
	]ge]]^ 5580 291.92 1595.5 0 20000 
 Export The dummy attains 1 if the firm exports its products / services 5580 0.241 0.428 0 1 
Control variables: Individual-level 
characteristics 
Professional 
education 
The dummy attains 1 if the entrepreneur has 
bachelor / master / PhD degree 5580 0.376 0.484 0 1 
Gender The dummy attains 1 if the entrepreneur is female 5580 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Age Age of the entrepreneur 5580 47.203 9.658 20 77 
Control 
variable: 
industry-level 
Industry performance  Averageindustry ROA 
1
q
Q]4	+	
	
W4e	4^^]^
l

 
5580 0.0299 0.035 -0.053 0.7832 
Note: SIC industries at four-digit level are treated as industry segments; at two-digit level are treated as industry group 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables 
 ROI ROS Entro Firm 
age Export 
Debt 
ratio 
Capital 
intensity 
Labor 
size 
Eco. 
Size 
Technical 
employ. 
Pro. 
Educ Gender Age 
Industry 
ROA 
ROI 1.0000              
ROS 0.740* 1.0000             
Entropy 0.278* 0.262* 1.0000            
Firm age 0.069* 0.112* 0.067* 1.0000           
Export 0.126* 0.141* 0.0268 0.105* 1.0000          
Debt 
ratio -.128* -.083* 0.063* -.061* 0.089* 1.0000         
Capital 
intensity -.035* -.072* -0.006 -.092* -.045* -.075* 1.0000        
Labor 
size 0.056* 0.0369 0.0015 0.065* 0.281* 0.376* -0.248* 1.0000       
Econo 
size 0.075* 0.055* 0.0274 0.0231 0.257* 0.477* 0.123* 0.685* 1.0000      
Technial 
employee 0.0182 -0.007 0.0307 -.106* -.0074 -.0064 0.5075* -.263* 0.153* 1.0000     
Pro. Educ 0.242* 0.281* 0.128* 0.0108 0.250* 0.175* -0.0198 0.189* 0.293* 0.1662* 1.0000    
Gender 0.066* 0.056* 0.044* -0.025 -.038* -.066* -0.0282 -.170* -.200* -0.039* -0.077* 1.0000   
Age 0.0003 -.0149 -.0211 0.302* 0.0183 -.089* -0.036* 0.043* -.0076 -0.106* -0.088* -.151* 1.000  
Industry 
ROA 0.047* 0.0057 -.045* 0.097* 0.092* 0.0069 0.0081 0.052* 0.116* 0.063* 0.0614* -.095* .056* 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 1% level 
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Appendix C: Firm performance (ROS as the dependent variable) 
 
 Firm return on sales (ROS)  
 
Static model 
PQd = @ + ?@ + T + 7 
Dynamic model 
PQd= PQdR@ + @ + ?@S + T + 7 
     FE RE GMM GMM 
exogenous 
GMM 
endogenous 
ROS (t-1)    0.264** (0.049) 
0.259** 
(0.046) 
Entropy 0.518** (0.115) 
0.253** 
(0.056) 
0.259** 
(0.042) 
0.663** 
(0.173) 
0.65** 
(0.166) 
Entropysquared -0.201* (0.095) 
-0.041 
(0.063) 
-0.06 
(0.047) 
-0.291** 
(0.131) 
-0.282* 
(0.129) 
Technologicalresources 0.054 (0.035) 
-0.0211 
(0.031) 
0.028 
(0.031) 
0.068 
(0.063) 
0.068 
(0.063) 
Leverage (debt ratio) -0.006 (0.02) 
-0.043** 
(0.016) 
-0.069** 
(0.011) 
-0.045 
(0.03) 
-0.045 
(0.03) 
Capital intensity -0.0001 (0.0004) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.00017) 
-0.0004** 
(0.00017) 
Export 0.023** (0.007) 
0.037** 
(0.006) 
0.044** 
(0.005) 
0.037** 
(0.01) 
0.037** 
(0.01) 
Firmage 0.0018 (0.0011) 
-0.0006 
(0.00004) 
-0.003** 
(0.0004) 
0.002 
(0.0013) 
0.002 
(0.0013) 
Economicsize -0.0062 (0.021) 
-0.045* 
(0.023) 
-0.057** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0145 
(0.023) 
-0.0145 
(0.023) 
Economicsizesquared 0.0003 (0.001) 
0.0017 
(0.0011) 
0.003 
(0.0006) 
0.0018 
(0.0013) 
0.0017 
(0.0013) 
Laborsize 0.0195** (0.0075) 
0.0002 
(0.0046) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.0123 
(0.011) 
0.0123 
(0.011) 
Professioneducation Y/N 0.216** (0.0145) 
0.161** 
(0.01) 
0.108** 
(0.0058) 
0.154** 
(0.018) 
0.154** 
(0.018) 
Gender  0.025* (0.013) 
0.022** 
(0.0077)   
Age -0.0044* (0.0023) 
-0.0006 
(0.004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.0057* 
(0.002) 
Averageindustry ROS 0.145 (0.116) 
0.029 
(0.124) 
0.288* 
(0.121) 
0.152 
(0.101) 
0.148 
(0.101) 
Intercept -0.014 (0.139) 
0.196 
(0.11) 
0.281** 
(0.062) 
0.088 
(0.168) 
0.11 
(0.174) 
F-value F(13,4637) 
=29.44**  F(14) =62**   
Wald Chi-sq  H (14)= 446.82**  
H (14) = 
357.11** 
H (14)= 
365.44** 
Hausman test H (12) = 216.03**    
Hansen J statistic  
of excluded instruments 
H (1)= 
3.3 
P = 0.07 
  
Observations 5580 5580 4650 3720 3720 
Notes: (**): significant at 1% level; (*): significant at 5% level; Standard errors in brackets 
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